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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARY P. MASSEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs 
LEWIS H. PROTHERO and ALENE 
PROTHERO, husband and wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 18213 
~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in which Plaintiff seeks judicial 
recognition of her undivided one-fourth (1/4) interest in a 
family home, farm ground and other real property in Paragonah, 
Iron County, State of Utah, by way of quiet title to her 
interest. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. The trial court 
entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff/Respondent MARY P. 
MASSEY and quieted title in her to her undivided one-fourth 
(1/4) interest in the family home, family farm, and other 
family property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment 
entered by the trial court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not agree with the statement of facts 
made in Appellants' brief for the reasons that it is incomplete, 
omits material facts, makes assertions not supported by the 
record, and generally is a statement of facts as Appellants 
wish them to be, not as found by the trial court. Further, 
Appellants failed to view and state the facts in the light 
most favorable to the findings and rulings of the trial court. 
GENEALOGICAL INFORMATION 
During their lives, JONATHAN DAVID PROTHERO and AMY 
ELIZABETH BARTON PROTHERO were man and wife. During their 
marriage, the following children were born to them in their 
order of birth: 
A. EVELYN PROTHERO SCQTT MASTERIA. 
B. DAVID BARTON PROTHERO. 
C. REX WILLIAM PROTHERO. 
D. LEWIS HENRY PROTHERO. 
E. RAYMOND CHARLES PROTHERO. 
F. ROE PROTHERO. 
G. MARY ELIZABETH PROTHERO MASSEY. 
(R40, F of Fl; R53, pages 7:25, 8, 9, 10:1-23). 
The following members of the nuclear family consisting 
of JONATHAN DAVID PROTHERO and AMY ELIZABETH BARTON PROTHERO 
and their children, died intestate as set forth below: 
A. ROE PROTHERO died shortly after his birth, his 
exact date of death being uncertain, but occurring before 
2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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the deaths of the other members of the PROTHERO family, 
including his parents. ROE PROTHERO never married and left 
no issue. 
B. JONATHAN DAVID PROTHERO died on 21 October 
1953. 
C. AMY ELIZABETH BARTON PROTHERO passed away on 7 
August 1958. 
D. RAYMOND CHARLES PROTHERO died on 16 November 
1961. He did not marry during life and left no issue. 
E. DAVID BARTON PROTHERO died 28 January 1966. He 
left no surviving spouse or issue. 
F. REX WILLIAM PROTHERO expired on 13 November 
1978, leaving his surviving wife, RUTH PROTHERO, and two 
surviving issue, LEVAN PROTHERO and MERTIN PROTHERO. At the 
time of trial, EVELYN PROTHERO SCOTT MASTERIA, LEWIS HENRY 
PROTHERO and MARY ELIZABETH PROTHERO MASSEY were the only 
living children of the JONATHAN DAVID and AMY ELIZABETH 
BARTON PROTHERO family. 
(R40, F of F 2; R53, pages 8, 9, 10, 11, 12). 
OWNERSHIP AND USE OF REAL PROPERTY 
The real property which was owned by members of the 
PROTHERO family was in seven (7) parcels in the area of 
Paragonah, Iron County, Utah, and consisted of the family 
home and lot, a vacant city lot, and the family farm. (R40, 
F of F 3). 
Insofar as is pertinent to this action, the real property 
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was owned originally by JONATHAN DAVID PROTHERO and AMY 
ELIZABETH BARTON PROTHERO. (R40, F of F 4; Exhibit P-4). 
Following World War II, a part of the farm property was 
conveyed by JONATHAN DAVID PROTHERO and AMY ELIZABETH BARTON 
PROTHERO to their son, RAYMOND CHARLES PROTHERO, who lived 
in the family home until his death on 16 November 1961. 
(R40, F of F 5; Exhibit P-4; R53, page 13:17-21). 
Prior to the death of JONATHAN DAVID PROTHERO, the home 
and farm properties were used by him, his wife, and RAYMOND 
CHARLES PROTHERO for the support of the family members 
living on and using them. After JONATHAN's death and until 
AMY's death, the properties were used for the support and 
benefit of AMY ELIZA.BETH BARTON PROTHERO and RAYMOND CHARLES 
PROTHERO, who were the family members actually occupying and 
using the properties. During this period, taxes were paid 
by AMY ELIZABETH BARTON PROTHERO, BARTON PROTHERO and 
RAYMOND PROTHERO. (R40, F of F 6; R53, pages 13:25, 14:1 -
12). 
After the death of the mother AMY, RAYMOND CHARLES 
PROTHERO continued to occupy and use the home and farm 
properties, although some use and benefit was made of the 
properties by DAVID BARTON PROTHERO, who moved back into the 
family home with RAYMOND at an unknown date. Prior to his 
death, RAYMOND paid property taxes which were levied by Iron 
County. (R40, F of F 7; R53, page 15:7-18). 
Following RAYMOND'S death on 16 November 1961, and 
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until his own death on 28 January 1966, DAVID BARTON PROTHERO 
occupied the real properties and took the benefit therefrom. 
He failed to pay certain property taxes which accrued during 
his occupancy. (R40, F of F 8; R53, page 18:11-23; Exhibits 
P-4, D-2, D-3). 
During the periods of RAYMOND'S and BARTON'S occupancy 
following the deaths of the PROTHERO parents, LEWIS HENRY 
PROTHERO, who resided in his own home in Paragonah with his 
wife, ALENE PROTHERO, may have assisted RAYMOND and BARTON 
to some degree with their farming operations, but took no 
substantial benefits from the properties. (R40, F of F 9). 
Following BARTON'S death and until the date of trial, 
LEWIS HENRY PROTHERO occupied and used the farm properties, 
benefiting himself thereby. The family home was left unoccupied 
and unrepaired following BARTON'S death, although it may 
have been used for storage purposes. The occupancy of 
Defendant LEWIS H. PROTHERO was not adverse to the interests 
of the co-owners of the property as set forth below, and was 
consistent with the co-tenancy interests held by LEWIS' 
siblings as well as being consistent with the PROTHERO 
family understandings, customs and agreements. (R40, F of F 
10). 
FAILURE OF LEWIS PROTHERO TO CONDUCT 
AGREED PROBATE PROCEEDINGS 
Although both PROTHERO parents died intestate, no 
probate of their real property interests was ever conducted. 
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(R40, F of F 11). 
Following RAYMOND'S death in November of 1961, and on 7 
October 1962, LEWIS HENRY PROTHERO met with MARY ELIZABETH 
PROTHERO MASSEY at her home in California. LEWIS asked for 
the 11 deeds" to the property. MARY and LEWIS discussed the 
need for probate of the estates of their parents and of the 
estate of RAYMOND. It was agreed that MARY would provide 
the "deeds" to LEWIS, and that LEWIS would handle and conduct 
the necessary probates so that those surviving would receive 
their appropriate inheritances under the Utah laws governing 
intestacy. (R40, F of F 12; R53, pages 16:4-25, 17:1-7, 74: 
17-5, 75:1-4). 
On or about 11 December 1962, MARY and her sister, 
EVELYN PROTHERO SCOTT MASTERIA, mailed the "deeds" to LEWIS, 
BARTON and AMASA STONES, all of Paragonah, Utah. The evidence 
was in conflict as to just who actually received the "deeds" 
from the post office, but it is undisputed that they ended 
up in the possession of LEWIS HENRY PROTHERO, who, despite 
his representations to MARY in October 1962, never did 
conduct probate proceedings. (R40, F of F 13; R-53, pages 
17:6-24, 35:2-25, 36:2-25, 36:1-19). 
MARY reasonably relied upon the representations of 
LEWIS that probate proceedings would be conducted so that 
each heir would receive his or her share. MARY was not 
familiar with the actions required by probate proceedings 
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and believed that appropriate proceedings would be or had 
been conducted until she discovered LEWIS' failure in 1976, 
as set forth below. (R40, F of F 14; R53, pages 35:11-16, 
37:1-3, 57:1-2). 
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, FAMILY AGREEMENTS, 
AND USE BY FAMILY MEMBERS OF FAMILY HOME 
FARM AND PROPERTY 
The PROTHERO children, with the exception of RAYMOND, 
moved away from home upon reaching adulthood. EVELYN, REX, 
and MARY moved to California. BARTON moved away but eventually 
returned to Paragonah. LEWIS purchased his own home in 
Paragonah. (R40, F of F 15). 
The members of the PROTHERO family viewed the home and 
farm properties in Paragonah as their "family" properties, 
and understood that each family member had an equal interest 
in the properties, although not physically occupying them at 
any given time. The family members, including LEWIS HENRY 
PROTHERO, had an understanding and agreement that those 
members who were in actual physical occupancy of the home 
and farm properties could derive the benefits from their 
occupancy, but that such occupants also had the concomitant 
duties of "taking care of" the properties, keeping them in 
good condition and repair, and paying all taxes and assessments 
which might accrue against the lands for the benefit of all 
concerned. (R40, F of F 16; R53, pages 14:25, 15:1-4, 19: 6-
9, 35: 4-7, 46:6-13, 49:9-13, 64:22-25, 65:1-5, 70:21-25, 
71:1-8). 
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At all times pertinent to this action and until the 
disputes which are the subject matter of this action arose, 
all surviving members of the PROTHERO family had complete 
trust and confidence in each other, and had no idea or 
reason for believing that one member might attempt to take 
advantage of any situation to the detriment of any other 
member or members. The PROTHERO family was very close. The 
occupancy of Defendants PROTHERO was consistent with the co-
tenancy interests of LEWIS' siblings and with PROTHERO 
family understandings and agreements. (R40, F of F 17; R53, 
page 71:8-20). 
At various times those members of the family, including 
Plaintiff, who resided outside the State of Utah, returned 
to,Paragonah for purposes of visiting remaining family 
members and friends, visiting the family home, deer hunting, 
family reunions, visiting graves of deceased family members, 
and generally renewing and preserving their ties with their 
family, friends, home and properties. In so doing, they 
acted as would any owner would who resides in another state 
but who retains ties to his birthplace. MARY, herself, was 
born in the family home, and at all times pertinent to this 
action, occupied the family home and properties in her own 
right as a non-resident owner would do. (R40, F of F 18). 
When family members returned to Paragonah, they stayed 
not only in the family home, but with other relatives, 
friends, and occasionally in conunercial acconunodations. 
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Following the death of BARTON in 1966, the family home was 
not occupied. On many occasions after BARTON died, and after the 
tax sale in 1967, Plaintiff and her family members were 
given the hospitality of Defendants' home while in Paragonah, 
at the express invitation of Defendants. (R40, F of F 19). 
PROPERTY TAX SITUATION AND TAX SALE 
Some time in May of 1967, after he began use of the 
family properties following the death of BARTON, Defendant 
LEWIS HENRY PROTHERO went to the Iron County Courthouse in 
Parowan, Utah, for the specific purposes of determining 
whether any property taxes or other assessments on the 
family properties required payment and if so, to pay them 
for the benefit of all remaining family members. He understood 
and felt that it was his duty to pay such taxes and assessments 
since he was the only remaining family member who was 
physically using the properties at the time. LEWIS assumed 
that BARTON had paid the taxes during BARTON's use of the 
properties. (R40, F of F 20; R53, pages 64: 22-25; 65: 
1-5, 14-20; 66:11-17, 94:6-25, 95:1-6). 
Upon arriving in Parowan, LEWIS contacted GENE ROBB, 
then the Iron County Tax Assessor or Treasurer, and determined 
that BARTON had failed to pay the required property taxes 
for the year 1962, the year following RAYMOND'S death. LEWIS 
offered to pay the back taxes but was deterred from so doing 
by Mr. ROBB, who informed him that the properties would be 
sold at tax sale in a day or two, and that he, LEWIS, could 
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purchase the properties for himself if he would bid for them 
at the tax sale. (R40, F of F 21; R53, pages 65 and 66). 
LEWIS then, or shortly thereafter, determined that he 
would attempt to purchase the properties for himself at the 
tax sale. Although he had the telephone numbers of his 
surviving brother, REX WILLIAM PROTHERO and of his sisters 
EVELYN PROTHERO SCOTT MASTERIA and MARY ELIZABETH PROTHERO 
:MASSEY, LEWIS determined not to call and inform them of the 
sale, he desiring to be the only family member present to 
bid for the property. HR. GENE ROBB and MR. CLAIR HULET had 
informed LEWIS that PROTHERO family members would be given 
preference in the bidding. MARY was capable of paying all 
or part of the delinquency, and would have done so had she 
been advised of the situation. (R40, F of F 22; R53, pages 
6 7-69' 22: 10-25' 23: 1-2). 
On 31 May 1967, LEWIS HENRY PROTHERO appeared at the 
tax sale in Parowan. Two other individuals were there to 
bid on the PROTHERO properties, but did not bid when told by 
LEWIS that he would enter a bid as a family member, with 
preference due to such a bid. LEWIS HENRY PROTHERO bid the 
sum of $55.01 for the home and farm properties, which was 
the total of the 1962 unpaid taxes, plus penalties and 
interest. On the same day, LEWIS received tax deeds to the 
properties. At his request, ALENE PROTHERO was listed as a 
grantee on the tax deeds, although the money used to p~y the 
10 
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amount bid came from LEWIS' earnings as a mine employee. 
(R40, F of F 23; R53, pages 69-71). 
The tax deeds were recorded on 31 May 1967. LEWIS did 
not inform MARY or his other siblings of his purchase at tax 
sale or of the recordation of the tax deeds at the time of 
purchase and recordation. Thereafter, and up to and including 
the time of trial, LEWIS HENRY PROTHERO paid all property 
taxes levied upon the family home and farm properties. (R40, 
F of F 24; Exhibits P-4, D-2, D-3, and D-1). He did so 
for the benefit of all the heirs. (R40, C of L 7). 
RESPONDENT'S DISCOVERY OF APPELLANTS' CLAIMS 
In or about the month of May 1974, while on one of her 
regular Memorial Day visits to the properties, MARY had a 
. 
conversation with LEWIS in which.she requested that they 
"fix up" the family home together. LEWIS' response was 
essentially that of "Not right at this time". MARY then 
dropped the subject. (R40, F of F 25; R53, pages 27:15-25, 
28:1-18). 
In 1975, MARY and LEWIS did not discuss the situation 
of the family home and the farm properties. MARY did vis~t 
with LEWIS while in Utah both for the Memorial Day Holiday 
and for the BARTON family reunion. (R40, F of F 26; R53, 
page 29: 10-14). 
Somewhere around the Memorial Day holiday in 1976, 
while MARY was in Paragonah, LEWIS first told MARY that (a) 
he had purchased the property at tax sale, (b) that the 
property was his alone, and (c) that he had conducted no 
11 
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probate proceedings. This news was such a shock to MARY 
that she responded with high dudgeon and some profanity. 
(R40, F of F 27; R53, pages 30, 31:1-16). 
Altho~gh told of LEWIS' purchase at tax sale while in 
Paragonah in 1976, MARY could not believe that her trusted 
brother meant what he had said, and that he truly claimed 
all interest in the family home and farm, free and clear of 
what otherwise would be the interests of his siblings. The 
claim was finally "brought home" to MARY on or about Memorial 
Dc-.y of 1977, when LEWIS saw her visiting the family home and 
warned her to leave, not to come back, and that he would 
"have the Sheriff" on her if she set foot on the property 
again. This action was begun shortly after this incident, 
on or about 31 August 1977, after MARY had time to consult 
an attorney. (R40, F of F 28; R53, pages 31:17-25, 32:1-16). 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In essence, this appeal represents the attempt of 
Defendants to deprive their surviving relatives of their 
interests in the family home, farm, and properties, despite 
the facts that (1) Defendant 1EWIS PROTHERO in 1962 promised 
to probate the family estate, yet never did so; (2) when 
LEWIS PROTHERO discovered the properties were to be sold at 
tax sale in 1967, although he originally went to the county 
seat with the intention of paying the taxes, he then determined 
that he would purchase the estate properties for himself; 
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(3) he did so, using his own money, and directed that the 
name of ALENE PROTHERO be placed on the tax deed; and (4) he 
then told no one of his acts and waited until such time as 
he believed that the seven (7) year period related to adverse 
possession had expired before telling his sister, MARY P. 
MASSEY, that he claimed the land. 
The trial court found all issues in favor of Plaintiff 
MARY P. MASSEY. 
POINT I 
AT THE TIMES OF DEATH OF THE VARIOUS 
PROTHERO DECEDENTS, THE FAMILY PROPERTIES 
PASSED INTO THE OWNERSHIP OF THE SURVIVING 
FAMILY MEMBERS AS TENANTS IN COMMON. 
UCA 74-4-2 (1953, as amended), states: 
"PROPERTY OF INTESTATE PASSES SUBJECT TO 
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS. The property, both real 
and personal, of one who dies without disposing 
of it by will passes to the heirs of the intestate, 
subject to the control of the court, and to the 
possession of any administrator appointed by the 
court for the purpose of administration." 
In Renesland v Ellenberger, 574 P.2d 217 (Kansas 1977), 
the Kansas Court of Appeals in a case with facts very similar 
to this one, stated at page 222: 
''When property passes by inheritance to more 
than one person, the heirs take the property 
as tenants in common, unless a contrary intent 
is shown." 
In Chamberlain vs Larsen, 29 P.2d 355 (Utah, 1934), 
which treated the issue of delivery of a conveyance, the 
Supreme Court held that upon the death of a decedent, title 
to property of which the decedent died possessed, immediately 
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vested in her.heirs. Also, in the case of In Re: Smithfield 
City, 262 P. 105 (Utah, 1972), this Court held that the 
property of one dying intestate passes to his heirs at once, 
subject to control of the Court for purposes of administration. 
UCA 57-1-5 (1953, as amended) requires that a tenancy 
in common will be presumed where the conveyance is silent. 
This statute basically expresses the rule that after passage 
of the statute of 12 Charles II, Chapter 24, Section 1, 
effective in 1660, which abolished military tenures and 
converted them into free and common socage, both courts of 
equity and law, in absence of express words to the contrary, 
ceased to favor joint tenancies and instead tenancies in 
common were favored and presumed. See Neill v Royce, 120 
P.2d 327, (Utah, 1940). 
The cases and statutes cited above leave no other 
conclusion than that the s~rviving children and siblings of 
decedents PROTHERO were immediately vested with title to the 
property as tenants in common as of the various dates of 
death. Appellants have not contested this fact. 
POINT II 
A TENANCY IN COMMON IS NOT TERMINATED BY 
A SALE TO THE COUNTY FOR TAXES, NOR BY 
A LATER TAX SALE TO ONE OF THE TENANTS 
IN COMMON. 
Appellants assert that the failure to pay taxes in 1962 
resulted in the sale of the property to Iron County on 15 
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January 1963. They then rely upon 20 AM. JUR. 2d "Cotenancy 
and Joint Ownership 1', § 31 for the proposition that the 
cotenancy relationship was terminated. No case authority to 
that effect was quoted. 
Even if we were to rely upon the wording quoted by 
Appellants, it is clear that the tenancy in common was not 
terminated. Any tax certificate prepared in 1963 to Iron 
County did not change the possessory rights to the PROTHERO 
family property. Iron County did not go into possession. 
No on~ lost possession. Possession remained in the members 
of the PROTHERO family. The unity of possession was never 
severed or destroyed. 
It is universally held that a tenancy in corrunon requires 
for its existence but one unity, namely that of possession. 
Zolezzi v Michelis, 195 P.2d 835, at 837 (Cal. App., 1948). 
There is no authority whatever to the effect that the 
preparation of a tax certificate in 1963 would permit Iron 
County any possessory right in the PROTHERO family properties. 
The cases uniformly hold that even a tax sale, after 
the usual statutory procedures, will not result in the 
destruction of a tenancy in common where a co-tenant or 
someone in league with him purchases at the sale. 
In Reed v Nevins, 425 P.2d 813 (New Mexico 1967), the 
New Mexico Supreme Court held that the conduct of a tax 
sale, with the resultant issuance of a tax deed, did not 
15 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
destroy the existing tenancy in common. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held to the same effect in 
Boatman v Beard, 426 P.2d 349 (Oklahoma 1967); in Tatum v Jones, 
491 P.2d 283 (Oklahoma 1971), and in Bevan v Shelton, 469 
P.2d 245 (Oklahoma 1970). In Boatman we find a fact situation 
similar to the instant case. There, children of an intestate 
took equal shares as co-tenants. One of the children acquired 
a tax deed to the land. The tax deed did not destroy the co-
tenancy relationship, even though the other heirs did not 
appear to have considered that they had any interest in the 
land. In Bevan, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated: 
"While it is true that the purchaser at 
the tax sale ordinarily receives a virgin 
title, yet when the person morally bound 
to pay the taxes repurchases the land the 
rule of "public policy" steps in and 
prohibits him from absorbing and cutting 
of the right and title of his former 
co-tenants." 
In the Utah case of Mccready v, Fredericksen, 126 P. 
316, at page 318 (Utah 1912), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a tax sale will not ''operate to dissolve the relationship" 
between co-tenants. 
Clearly, for all purposes involved in this action, the 
tenancy in common existing between the PROTHERO brothers and 
sisters was never terminated, either by a sale to Iron 
County in 1963 or by the tax sale in 1967. Appellants' 
argument that the tenancy in common was terminated is simply 
without merit. 
16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
ONE TENANT IN COMMON MAY NOT SET UP A 
PURCHASE AT TAX SALE IN DERROGATION 
OF THE TITLE OF HIS CO-TENANTS. FURTHER, 
TENANTS IN COMMON STAND IN A FIDUCIARY 
RELATIONSHIP TO EACH OTHER, AND ARE 
BARRED AND ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING ANY 
CLAIM WHICH HAS ITS SOURCE IN A BREACH 
OF THAT RELATIONSHIP BY THE ASSERTING 
PARTY. 
Defendants PROTHERO may not set up the purchase at tax 
sale in derogation of the title of the other family members. 
In the case of Heiselt v Heiselt, 349 P.2d 175 (Utah, 
1960), at page 177, this Court established the rule that 
tenants in common stand in a fiduciary relationship to each 
other and that where one such tenant buys out an outstanding 
adversary claim to the common title, he cannot assert that 
claim for his exclusive benefit without the consent of his 
co-tenants, but holds it in trust for them. This position 
is in accord with UCA 59-10-57 (1953, as amended), which 
provides that either of two or more parties interested in a 
piece of property may redeem property sold at tax sale. In 
the case of Columbia Trust Company v Neilson, 287 P. 926 
(Utah, 1930), this Court specifically stated, at page 928: 
"The law is well settled that one tenant in common 
of a tract of land cannot set up a tax title 
acquired by him to defeat the title of his 
co-tenants." 
The Court cited 1 Tiffany, Real Property (2d Edition), 
Section 201, at page 695, and the cases cited in the footnote. 
In the case of Mccready v Fredericksen, 126 P. 316, 
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(Utah, 1912), the Supreme Court entered into a lengthy 
discussion concerning tenancy in common. The case involved a 
situation where one of the co-tenants failed to pay taxes, 
and then purported to purchase the land at tax sale. The 
Court held that the tenant in common may not acquire title 
as against his co-tenants by purchasing at a tax sale, and 
at page 318, stated: 
"Where land is owned by joint tenants, co-
parceners, or tenants-in-common, and taxes are 
assessed upon it as a whole, and it is sold for 
non-payment of the same, neither of the co-tenants 
can purchase the title after the sale, which shall 
be paramount to that of his companions or operate 
to dissolve the relationship. His payment is 
regarded as simply discharging the assessment and 
it will inure to the benefit of all. He acquires 
no other or greater interest than he held before, 
except that he has a claim upon the others for 
reimbursement according to their respective 
shares. This rule rests upon very obvious principles, 
and there is no possible question as to its 
justice and strict legality. For, in the first 
place, it is plainly a duty which any and each 
of the co-tenants owes to the state to pay the 
taxes upon the whole tract when they are so 
assessed. And, of course, he must not be allowed 
to reap an advantage from his neglect of this 
duty. But, in addition to this, there is a strong 
objection to such a proceeding arising from the 
mutual relations of the parties. It is well 
illustrated by the following remarks by the court 
in Kentucky: "As a general rule, one tenant 
in common before partition, is not permitted 
to purchase in a superior outstanding claim for 
his own exclusive benefit, and much less to use 
it for the expulsion of his co-tenant. Such a 
purchase is considered in equity as inuring to 
the benefit of both, and the purchaser is entitled 
to a contribution. This principle arises from 
the privity subsisting between parties having a 
common possession of the same land and a common 
interest in the safety of the possession of 
each, and it only inculcates that good faith 
which seems appropriate to their relative positions." 
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The Supreme Court relied upon Black on Tax Titles, 
sections 282 and 284; Freeman on Co-Tenancy, section 158; 
and on Cooley in his work on Taxation (3rd Edition), page 963. 
A redemption from a tax sale by one co-tenant operates as a 
redemption for all co-tenants. Chavez v Chavez, 244 P.2d 
781, (New Mexico, 1952). Because of the legal and moral 
obligation to pay taxes, a tenant who purchases tax title is 
trustee for his co-tenants which relationship continues 
until proper notice repudiating the trust relationship is 
given and no statute of limitations is applicable until 
proper repudiation of trust. McGee v Harrison, 277 P.2d 161 
(Oklahoma, 1954). One interested in land with others, all 
deriving their interest from a common source, cannot assert 
an absolute title to the land through a tax deed to the 
injury of such others. Stephens v Kesselburg, 143 P.2d 289 
(Washington 1943). 
Only a few cases have allowed one co-tenant to acquire 
the title of another co-tenant by tax deed. These few cases 
are differentiated by the fact that each interest was separately 
assessed and billed, i.e., there was not an assessment on 
the undivided whole, as there is in the instant case. 
Following the rule set forth above, which is not only 
the Utah rule, but the rule of every other jurisdiction, 
known to this author, on the facts of this case it is clear 
that Defendants PROTHERO may not set up their tax title 
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contrary to the interests of their co-tenants. When LEWIS 
PROTHERO bought at the tax sale, he did it for the benefit 
of his brothers and sisters, as well as for himself, the 
same as if he had been paying taxes all along. As will be 
discussed in detail later, "possession of one is possession 
of all 11 • Further, Defendant LEWIS PROTHERO cannot take 
advantage of his own delicts in failing to pay taxes to harm 
the interest of his co-tenants. 
Under the circumstances of this case, Appellants are in 
the position of a fiduciary with respect to their brothers 
and sisters and are barred and estopped from asserting that 
they now own the land by adverse possession, by way of tax 
deed, or by way of statute of limitation. 
A fiduciary relationship exists between tenants in 
common, and one of them may not gain a present advantage by 
acting adversely to his fellow tenants. Webster v Knopp, 
312 P.2d 557 (Utah 1957). A tenant in common who attempts 
to acquire title adverse to his co-tenants by purchase at 
tax sale will be regarded as holding such title in trust for 
his co-tenants. Ruthrauff v Silver King Western Mining and 
Milling Company, 80 P.2d 338 (Utah 1938). Any act done by a 
co-tenant for the protection of common property will be 
presumed to be for the benefit of all tenants. Sperry 
v Tolley, 199 P.2d 542 (Utah 1948). 
An interesting case is that of Lanigir v Arden, 409 
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P.2d 891, (Nevada, 1966). In Lanigir, one Phillip Arden 
died intestate, and title to the property vested equally in 
his eleven surviving children as tenants in common, subject 
to estate administration. One brother remained in actual 
possession of the family farm, paid taxes, made improvements, 
and even sold five small parcels. The wife of the brother 
who remained in possession was deeded the farm in a divorce 
settlement. In a subsequent quiet title action, the wife 
sought to assert the defense of adverse possession. The 
Nevada Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the trial Court, 
held that no adverse possession had been established and 
that each of the heirs of Phillip Arden owned an undivided 
one-eleventh interest in the farm and stated at page 895: 
11 Co-tenants who are brothers and sisters bear 
a fiduciary relationshi.p to one another. Each 
is entitled to trust the other and not question 
the conduct unless its purpose is clearly made 
known.'' 
Here, of course, MARY P. MASSEY was entitled to trust 
her brother and her sister-in-law, which she did until May 
of 1976. In any event, due to their conduct and the fiduciary 
relationship they bear to the Plaintiff, Defendants' possession 
was not sufficiently adverse to bring them within the ambit 
of the adversw possession statutes. 
Lanigir goes on to state that: 
"Even as between co-tenants who are not related, 
the tenant out of possession may assume that 
the permissive possession of his co-tenant is 
amicable until notified that it has become 
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hostile; and the evidence needed to show the 
hostility or notice must be stronger than that 
required in a case between strangers." 
Renesland v Ellenberger, above, indicates that the co-
tenant against whom adverse possession is claimed must have 
notice in fact or actual notice of the adverse and hostile 
intent of his co-tenant where this fiduciary relationship 
exists. Also see Tatum v Jones, 491 P.2d 283 (Oklahoma 
1971) and Mccready v Fredericksen, above. 
In the case of Giavani v Rescorla, 207 P.2d 1124 
(Arizona, 1949), the Arizona Supreme Court held that a 
person in a fiduciary relationship with another cannot 
assert adverse possession against that other, and that the 
statutes of limitations does not begin to run at all. In 
Giavani, the stepmother of certain minor children was appointed 
guardian of the children after the death of their father, 
and was never discharged as their guardian, even though they 
became of age. She sought to assert adverse possession 
against property in which the children had an interest, 
years later. The court held that so long as she was in a 
fiduciary relationship to the children, and had not been 
released by order of the Court, she could not initiate an 
adverse possession against the children, and the statutes of 
limitations would not begin to run against the children or 
the estate of a deceased child. 
Defendants PROTHERO, as brother, sister-in-law, trustees 
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and co-tenants in common with the rest of the family owed 
them a fiduciary duty. They cannot now claim any benefit by 
reason of having failed to meet that duty. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE 
TAX DEED STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, UCA 
78-12-5.1 AND 5.2 (1953, AS AMENDED). 
It is a well- settled rule in most jurisdictions that a 
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the 
person against whom it is asserted has notice of the facts 
involved and particularly, where a claim of adverse possession 
is involved, until the owner of the property has notice of 
the alleged open, notorious, hostile, and adverse possession 
and intent of the person asserting the claim. See Memmott 
v Bosh, 520 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1974)_, and McKnight v Basilides, 
143 P.2d 307 (Washington 1943). The same reasoning holds 
for the four year statutes of limitations with respect to 
tax deeds. In the instant case, of course, Plaintiff had no 
notice of the claims of Defendants until approximately May 
of 1976. She did not believe that the claims were serious 
until 1977. The claims of Defendants were finally "brought 
home" to Plaintiff at or about Memorial Day of 1977, when 
LEWIS saw MARY visiting the family home and warned her to 
leave, not to come back, and that he would "have the Sheriff" 
on her if she set foot on the property again. (R40, F of F 
28). 
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Further, the statutes relied upon by Appellants do not 
apply to disputes between those entitled to the benefit of a 
tax deed title. The lower court specifically found that the 
legislature's purpose in passing UCA 78-12-5.1 and 5.2 
(1953, as amended), manifestly was to enhance the marketability 
of tax titles by cutting off rights of previous owners. 
However, by reason of the trusts imposed on Defendants 
PROTHERO and because of the co-ownership of the PROTHERO 
family properties, the court specifically held that a dispute 
between tax title grantees does not infringe upon the purpose 
of the statute. Basically, the reason is that, as found by 
the trial court, the tax purchase was made for the benefit 
of all concerned, including Plaintiff. In other words, 
Plaintiff and all her brothers and sisters can claim the 
benefit of the tax purchase. It was made for them as well 
as for LEWIS. 
The statutes relied upon by Appellants are not applicable 
in cases in which the party bringing the action was "seized 
or possessed of such property within seven years from the 
commencement of the action", or where the person commencing 
the action or interposing the defense or his predecessor 
''had actually occupied or been in possession of such property 
within four years prior to the commencement or inposition of 
such action or defense . II 
The statutes in this case could not and did not run 
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against Plaintiff for the reason that she was always in 
actual possession of the premises as well as in legal possession 
through her co-tenants, LEWIS PROTHERO. 
The authorities are uniform in holding that one co-
tenant in possession holds possession for all. In the case 
of Kinny v Ewing, 49 P.2d 636 (California 1972), at page 
639, we read: 
II th ' f 
. . . . e possession o one co-tenant is in 
contemplation of the possession of the other." 
Also, see Schmitt v Felix, 321 P.2d 473 (California 1958), 
Fallon v Davidson, 320 P.2d 976 (Colorado 1958), and Barkus 
v Galdreadth, 207 P.2d 559 (Montana 1949). There is a 
plethora of additional cases standing for this proposition 
and space will not permit listing all such citations. 
Although counsel has been unable to discover a Utah 
case stating the proposition as clearly as Kinny, it is 
apparent in the fiduciary cases and in McCready, above, and 
others, that the proposition is accepted by this court, 
although not expressly stated. It necessarily follows that 
if a tenant who is out of possession and doesn't ever visit 
the property as in Mccready is deemed to be in possession 
for the purposes of contesting a tax deed, the fact that 
MARY P. MASSEY and her surviving siblings visited the family 
premises at least once a year and often more, is ~ fortiori, 
actual possession by said individuals in their own rights, 
as well as possession in law through LEWIS PROTHERO, their 
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co-tenant. 
The defense asserted by PROTHEROS must fail. MARY P. 
MASSEY and her surviving siblings actually occupied the land 
in their own right each year, as non-resident land holders 
would normally do. Further, MARY P. MASSEY and her surviving 
siblings, as co-tenants with LEWIS PROTHERO were in possession 
through Defendant LEWIS PROTHERO. 
UCA 78-12-7 (1953, as amended), states in effect that 
the title owner is presumed to be in possession unless the 
person claiming otherwise can clearly show that the owner 
was not in possession. Since the PROTHEROS cannot set up 
tax title to defeat title of their relatives, the presumption 
obtains and is not rebutable. 
Although a purchaser at tax sale ordinarily receives a 
virgin title, when persons morally bound to pay taxes repurchase 
land from a. purchaser at a tax sale, public policy prohibits 
them from absorbing and cutting off the rights and title of 
their former co-tenants. The tax deed statute of limitations 
does not apply where one co-tenant is in possession of ·land 
by right of inheritance or family agreement, and such possession 
will not be deemed to be adverse to co-tenants out of possession 
without a clear showing of the adverse claim being "brought 
home" to them. Bevan v Shelton, 469 P.2d 245 (Oklahoma 
1970). 
In the case of Boatman v Beard, 426 P.2d 349 (Oklahoma 
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1967), one co-tenant purchased a tax deed in 1932. No 
notice of ouster was given to any other co-tenant until 1950 
or 1951, 18 or 19 years later. Oklahoma had a five year 
statute of limitations applicable to tax deeds. The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court held that the tenant claiming the benefit of 
the statute of limitations was not entitled to such benefit 
for the reason that the statute of limitations did not begin 
to run in favor of one co-tenant in favor of others until 
actual ouster by the claiming co-tenant or other acts on his 
part amo~nting to total denial of the acts of others, and 
until actual notice or knowledge of such acts relied upon 
were "brought home" to them to show denial or repudiation of 
their rights. The Oklahoma Supreme Court so held despite 
the recordation of a tax deed. 
The matter was even more clearly stated by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court in McGee v Harrison, 277 P.2d 161 (Oklahoma 
1954). In McGee, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated at page 
162: 
11 Def endant had both a moral and legal 
obligation to pay the taxes on the land 
and his purchase of the tax title was 
a mode of paying taxes. (citing cases). 
By his purchase at tax sale, he became 
trustee for his co-tenants which relation-
ship continued until Defendant gave proper 
notice to his co-tenants that he was 
repudiating the trust and holding title 
adversely. The only notice given by Defendant 
before this suit was filed was that adverted 
to above which was not sufficient notice to 
repudiat~ the trust. No statue of limitation 
would start to run until repudiation of the 
trust relationship." 
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This court has held substantially the same as the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court in the case of Walker v Walker, 404 
P.2d 253 (Utah 1965). In Walker, the oldest son took title 
to the family property in order to provide a home for his 
mother. Although he took title in his own name, it was 
understood between the family members that he was holding 
the property for the benefit of the entire famiiy. Suit was 
not brought until after the death of the mother and forty-
two (42) years after the oldest son took title to the property. 
This court held that the defense of the statute of limitations 
is not available to a trustee as against his beneficiaries 
until something has occurred to give clear indication to 
them that he has repudiated his trust. 
In this action, Defendants did not repudiate the 
trust and, in fact, let "sleeping dogs lie" until 1976, when 
LEWIS first told Plaintiff that he had purchased the deed at 
tax sale. 
The Arizona Supreme Court held, in Giovani v 
Rescorla, 207 P.2d 1124 (Arizona 1949), that a trustee 
cannot take advantage of the statute of limitations as 
against his beneficiaries. 
In any event, as discussed in previous points, Appellants 
are not in any situation where they would be entitled to 
assert the statute of limitations against their co-tenants, 
particularly where LEWIS PROTHERO falsely represented that 
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he would probate the properties and then failed to do so. 
In addition to the statutes cited, Defendants rely on 
the cases of Dye v Miller and Viele, 587 P.2d 139 (Utah 
1978), Peterson v Callister, 313 P.2d 814 (Utah 1957), and 
on Frederiksen v Lafleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981). Appellants' 
reliance upon these cases is not well founded. None of 
these cases involves tenancy-in-common, actual possession, 
the existence of any fiduciary relationship, the creation 
and imposition of any trust, or any dispute between persons 
entitled to the benefit of tax title. Appellants have not 
cited any authority involving situations similar to those in 
this case, for the reason that there is no such authority 
favorable to them. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT ALENE PROTHERO OBTAINED NO 
INTEREST BY REASON OF THE TAX SALE 
GREATER THAN THE UNDIVIDED INTEREST 
HER HUSBAND OTHERWISE ENJOYED, AND 
IN ANY EVENT, COULD NOT AND DID NOT 
OBTAIN ANY INTEREST FREE OF THE CLAIM 
OF HER HUSBAND'S CO-TENANTS IN CO"MMON. 
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding 
a fiduciary duty on the part of ALENE PROTHERO, and in 
imposing the same upon her. Again, Appellants cite no 
authority to support their contention. 
Actually, ALENE PROTHERO appeared to be a stranger to 
the tax sale. She did not appear at the tax sale. No money 
earned by her was used to pay any part of the taxes, penalties 
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and interest relating to the unpaid 1962 taxes. The only 
money used was money earned by LEWIS PROTHERO at his employment 
at a mine. Although ALENE PROTHERO was not at the tax sale, 
her name appears on the tax deed for one reason only: her 
husband asked the auditor to put his wife's name on the 
deeds. Appellant ALENE PROTHERO did not pay any consideration 
whatever for the placing of her name on the deeds. 
Appellant ALENE PROTHERO cannot claim to be a bona fide 
purchaser for value, since she gave no value. Further, she 
knew that the properties were acquired through the deaths of 
other family members and that some of the family members 
were still alive. If she were deemed to take any interest, 
she must be deemed to have taken it with knowledge of the 
claims of her surviving brothers and sisters-in-law. By 
reason of that fact, any interest which she may have is 
subject to the prior interests of such brothers and sisters-
in-law. The trial court properly imposed a trust upon ALENE 
PROTHERO based upon the express understandings and agreements 
in the PROTHERO family as well as by reason of operation of 
law. 
In the case of Webster v Knop, 312 P.2d 557 (Utah 
1957), a mining location was made by one of the partners to 
a grubstake agreement in an area which was not open to 
location. The location was void because of the existence 
of a valid oil and gas lease on the property. Later, after 
Congress passed legislation allowing mineral claims to be 
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filed over existing oil and gas leases on public domain, 
another of the partners to the grubstake agreement filed a 
new location, using the same discovery markers and monuments 
but filing the notice of location in his own name. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that technically there was no "relocation", 
but that the newly-locating partner held the location in 
trust for all of the partners to the prior grubstake agreements. 
This court also went further and held that subsequent transferees, 
who had notice of the grubstake agreements and of the 
original location in the names of the parties to that agreement 
were not bona fide purchasers of the claim which was relocated 
by one of the original co-locaters after the termination of 
the agreement, and held that the subsequent transferees did 
not take free of the equitable constructive trust interests 
of the other original locators. 
ALENE PROTHERO, of course, knew of the family situation 
and the situation with respect to the properties. Any 
interests which she might have obtained by reason of the tax 
deeds could not have been any greater than the interests 
held by her husband, LEWIS PROTHERO, who caused her name to 
be placed on the tax deeds, and in any event, is subject to 
the interests of her surviving brothers and sisters-in-law. 
In addition, the Courts have held that one co-tenant 
may not interpose his spouse or even a third party at tax 
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sale or thereafter in order to def eat the claims of his co-
tenants. In Bevan v Shelton, 469 P.2d 245, (Oklahoma 1970), 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that where a person morally 
bound to pay taxes repurchases land from the purchaser at 
tax sale, public policy prohibits him from asserting and 
cutting off the rights and titles of his former co-tenants. 
In other words, even if LEWIS PROTHERO had not bid in at the 
tax sale, but had permitted the land to be sold to a third 
party, and had then purchased the land from the third party, 
that action would not have cut off the rights of the other 
PROTHERO brothers and sisters. How, then, can appellants 
assert that the mere placing of the name of ALENE PROTHERO 
on the tax deeds by her husband can terminate such rights? 
In Myers v Parkins, 412 P.2d 136 (Oklahoma 1965), the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that -the purchase of land by one 
who, despite his moral or legal obligation to pay taxes on 
land, permitted the land to be sold for taxes and then 
bought it, either in person or indirectly through the agency 
of another, is deemed only a mode of paying taxes, and the 
purchaser does not thereby acquire any title in the land 
antagonistic to that of his co-tenants. Appellants PROTHERO 
cannot therefore use the name of the wife as a means of 
defeating the claims of brothers and sisters who are co-
tenants. 
In Apodaca v Hernandez, 302 P.2d 177 (New Mexico 1956), 
the New Mexico Supreme Court held that where a mother and 
father who owned realty died intestate, and there was no 
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administration of their estates, and where one of the sons 
who lived on the realty permitted it to be sold for delinquent 
taxes and such son and his wife, knowing that they could not 
purchase the tax title in their own names free and clear of 
the names of their co-tenants, advanced money to a third 
person who purchased the tax title; received a tax deed, and 
then conveyed the realty by quit claim deed to the son, the 
method employed by the son and his wife in acquiring title 
did not constitute such a claim under color of title made in 
good faith as to lay the foundation for the application of 
the statute of limitations relating to adverse possession. 
Clearly, any interest of Appellant ALENE PROTHERO in 
the realty is (1) no greater than the undivided interest 
originally held by her husband L£.WIS PROTHERO, (2) is subject 
to the claims of her brothers and sisters-in-law and (3) is 
properly subject to the trust imposed by the trial court as 
a result of express family agreements, understandings and by 
reason of operation of law. 
POINT VI 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS 
OF THE LAW RELATING TO ADVERSE POSSESSION, 
NOT HAVING MET THE APPROPRIATE REQUIREMENTS. 
Appellants claim the benefit of the laws relating to 
adverse possession, despite the holding of the lower court 
that they failed to prove their entitlement to the properties 
under the doctrine of adverse possession. The trial court 
found that all taxes paid by Defendants following 31 May 
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1967 through May 1976 were paid for the benefit of all the 
heirs to the property. The trial court further found that 
the defendants' occupancy of the property was not of the 
nature or period required by the law of adverse possession, 
and that specifically, Defendants had a fiduciary duty to 
Plaintiff to preserve and protect the respective family 
interests in the property, not only because of the relationship 
of co-tenancy, but also from the express and implied promises 
arising in the PROTHERO family, including that agreement 
that the person using the properties be required to pay 
property taxes and assessments. 
Further, the tax deeds acquired by Appellants do not 
constitute claim or color of title in good faith which will 
form a foundation for adverse possession. Where a co-tenant 
delays performance of his duty to pay taxes and redeem the 
property on behalf of all the tenants in common, such failure 
establishes that the "color of title" which would otherwise 
be provided by the tax deed is not a good faith claim adverse 
to the interests of the other co-tenants to establish title 
by adverse possession. Reed v Nevins, 425 P.2d 813 (New 
Mexico 1967). 
Although a given paper may constitute "color or claim 
of title", no prescription can be based thereon unless the 
claimant entered thereon honestly and in good faith. Adverse 
possession must be openly hostile in order to result in. 
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title by adverse possession. In a situation where a mother 
and father who owned realty died intestate, and there was no 
administration of their estates, and one of the sons who 
lived on the realty permitted it to be sold for delinquent 
taxes, and the son and his wife, knowing that they could not 
purchase the tax title in their own names free of the claims 
of their co-tenants advanced money to a third person who did 
purchase the tax title and received a tax deed, and then 
conveyed the realty by quit claim deed to the son, the 
method employed by the son and his wife in acquiring title 
through the tax deed was not such a claim under color of 
title made in good faith as would lay the foundation for the 
application of the statute of limitations relating to adverse 
possession. Apodaca v Hernandez~ 302 P.2d 177 (New Mexico 
1956). 
Further, the taxes were not paid in such a manner that 
appellants could take advantage of such payments in relation 
to their claim of adverse possession. The lower court 
specifically found that the taxes were paid for the benefit 
of all the heirs, up to and including May of 1976. This 
action was filed in August of 1977. Obviously, the taxes 
were not paid by Defendants for the period of time required 
by the statutes relating to adverse possession in such a 
manner that appellants could claim the benefit of the payment, 
since the payments were made for the benefit of all prior to 
May of 1976. Further, the payment of taxes is not notice of 
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any claim relating to adverse possession. Heiselt v Heiselt, 
349 P.2d 175 (Utah 1960). The testimony before the trial 
court did not support any contention that Appellants made 
any substantial improvements. Some improvements were made, 
of course, but they were minimal in nature. In any event, 
none of the improvements were attributable in any manner to 
the claim of adverse possession. The fact that a co-tenant 
in possession of land makes even extensive improvements 
thereon while living there is not inconsistent with the 
existence of a co-tenancy. Heiselt, above. 
In any event, there was no adverse use prior to 1976. 
As a matter of fact, the reality of the claim of adverse 
possession was not "brought home" to Plaintiff until 1977. 
All prior use of the family prop~rties was totally consistent 
with the existence of the tenancy in common. 
One co-tenant can adversly possess against another, but 
because possession of one co-tenant is considered possession 
of all, the act of the co-tenant in possession cannot be 
assumed to be sufficiently hostile from the fact of possession 
alone; generally, some notice of the intent of the co-
tenant in possession to adversly possess against his other 
co-tenants is required, and without such notice, co-tenants 
out of possession are rightfully entitled to assume that their 
co-tenant is holding the property for all. Kennedy v 
Rhinehart, 574 P.2d 1119 (Oregon 1978). 
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Even the exclusive occupancy by a tenant in common is 
deemed permissive and cannot become adverse until the tenant 
out of possession has had notice that the possession of his 
co-tenant is hostile against him. Zolezzi v Michelis, 195 
,P.2d 835 (Cal. App., 1948). 
Before a tenant in common can acquire the interest of 
his co-tenants by adverse possession, there must be an 
actual ouster by the co-tenant or some act or acts sufficient 
to establish repudiation of rights of the co-tenants, and 
absent some conduct which discloses a complete denial of 
interest of a co-tenant, even exclusive possession by his 
co-tenant is considered to be in subordination to his rights 
and does not amount to adverse possession. Even the use of 
property for grazing, fencing of it, paying property taxes, 
collecting rents, mortgaging part of the property and executing 
·oil and gas leases and retaining the money from them are 
insufficient to notify co-tenants that their rights and 
I 
properties have been repudiated and do not constitute an 
ouster. Tatum v Jones, 491 P.2d 283 (Oklahoma 1971). 
Possession originating in co-tenancy is permissive, not 
hostile, and is not adverse possession. Occupation of the 
family estate by one of the family is so usual that acts of 
, occupation thereof which would be sufficient to show hostile 
possession as to strangers, are not sufficient as between 
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the family members. Apodaca, above. 
Any act done by a co-tenant for the protection of the 
common property will be presumed to be for the benefit of 
all the tenants. The fact that a tenant in common makes 
repairs and improvements, dwellings, buildings, and fences 
on the common property does not indicate an intent to hold 
adversly to the other tenants in common, since such acts are 
consistent with the tenancy and not adverse to it. Further, 
the fact that tenants in common might be in exclusive 
possession of the property for more than seven years does 
not show that their possession is adverse to the other 
tenants, since each co-tenant is entitled to possession of 
the entire property. Sperry v Tolley, 199 P.2d 542 (Utah, 
1948). 
Before a co-tenant may make any claim adverse to the 
interests of his co-tenants, and before the statute of 
limitations relating to adverse possession begins to run, he 
must "bring home" his adverse claim to his co-tenants. See 
Memmott v Bosch, supra; Boatman v Beard, supra; McReady 
v Fredericksen, supra; Apodaca v Hernandez, supra; 
Sperry v Tolley, supra; Tatum v Jones, supra; and Laniger, 
v Arden, supra. 
The obtaining and recording of a tax deed does not 
constitute notice of an adverse claim. See Sperry v Tolley, 
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above, where this Court held that the fact that a co-tenant 
purchased a tax title to the common property in his own 
name, is insufficient to put his co-tenants on notice that 
he is claiming the property adversly to them. Also see 
Boatman, above, holding that the acquisition of a tax deed 
did not destroy the co-tenancy relationship. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE 
LAW IMPOSED A TRUST UPON APPELLANTS. 
In their brief, Appellants do not dispute the holding 
of the trial court that appellants were the subjects of a 
trust imposed by law and by reason of the express family 
agreements and understandings relating to the property. 
The law provides for the imposition of "resulting" and 
"constructive" trusts in the appropriate circumstances. See 
76 AM. JUR. 2d, Trusts, § 189 - 250 (1975 as amended). 
The clear inference arising from the holdings of all 
the cases relating to the purchase of tax deeds where co-
tenants are involved is that the one who purchases the tax 
title does so in trust for the benefit of his co-tenants as 
well as for his own benefit, he being under a moral and 
legal obligation to pay the taxes. The purchase is viewed 
as nothing more than a manner of paying the taxes. He will 
not be allowed to assert that tax purchase in derogation 
of the rights and titles of his co-tenants. The fact that a 
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spouse or third party may be named on the tax deed is 
irrelevant, and such spouse or third party takes subject to 
the interests of the other co-tenants. 
At times, the courts have imposed trusts on co-tenants, 
and even on those not co-tenants, to correct situations 
similar to the case at bar. In the case of Hendrickson 
v California Talc, 130 P.2d 806 (Cal. App. 1943), the 
appellate court held that where locators of a mining claim 
associated themselves together for the purpose of obtaining 
title to a claim and complying with all legal requirements, 
but where their efforts were ineffective for the time being 
because the land was temporarily withdrawn from entry, and 
one of them, after discovering the invalidity of the entry, 
and without informing the others of such fact, relocated the 
land for himself alone when the right of entry was restored, 
the person doing the relocating was held to be a trustee for 
the other locators, even if the other locators were not, 
~ 
strictly speaking, co-tenants with him, for the reason that 
the trust resulted from the parties' fiduciary relationship. 
The appellte court also held that a fiduciary relationship 
exists between tenants in common, and that one of them may 
not gain a present advantage by acting adversly to his 
fellow tenants. 
In Webster v Knop, 312 P.2d 557 (Utah 1957), this 
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court upheld the trial court's action in imposing a trust 
upon a mining property. The facts were essentially that 
mining claims were located under a grubstake agreement in 
which those making the agreements were to take a one-third 
interest. The location was void because of the existence of 
an oil and gas lease. Subsequently, congress changed the 
law so that it was possible to locate a mineral claim on 
land which had an oil and gas lease in existence. One of 
the parties to the original grubstake agreement then "relocated" 
the claims, and sold them. The other parties to the grubstake 
agreement brought suit for their share in the mining properties 
against the transferees. The lower court held that the 
property was subject to a constructive trust. This Court 
found Hendrickson v California Talc to be dispositive. It 
agreed with the reasoning of the -California court when it 
stated that the "trust results from the fiduciary relation 
of the parties and not from whether or not they may technically 
be said to be co-tenants". This court then went on to hold 
that a constructive trust arose to protect the interest of 
the original co-locators under the grubstake agreement, and 
went on to analyze whether the constructive trust could be 
imposed not only on the original locator but upon the transferees. 
At page 560, this court stated: 
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"The equitable interest of a trust in 
the beneficiaries may be cut off as 
against a bona fide purchaser for value 
from the trustee or constructive trustee. 
He must have had no notice, actual or 
constructive, and he must pay value. 
Peterson v Peterson, 112 Utah 554, 
190 P.2d 135. As stated in the 
Restatement Restitution, § 12(a), adopted 
in the Peterson case: 
"A person has notice of facts 
giving rise to a constructive 
trust not only when he knows 
them, but also when he should 
know them; that is, when he 
knows facts which would lead 
a reasonably intelligent and 
diligent person to inquire 
whether there are circumstances 
which would give rise to a 
constructive trust, and if such 
inquiry when pursued with 
reasonable intelligence and 
diligence would give him 
knowledge or reason to know 
of such circumstances." 
In this situation, both Appellants were fully aware of 
the facts relating to the demise of the various members of 
the PROTHERO families. They were also aware of the understandings 
and express agreements between the PROTHERO family members 
that those persons using the family properties would be 
required to maintain them, protect them, and pay the taxes 
on them in return for the benefit derived from the use of 
the properties. Appellant LEWIS H. PROTHERO alone paid even 
minimal consideration, consisting only of the taxes, penalties 
and interest, which had accrued with respect to the year 
1962. ALENE PROTHERO paid nothing. Both were fully aware 
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1~t 
of the situation. 
In equity, the trial court imposed a trust upon Appellants 
in order to prevent the perpetration of severe injustice and 
fraud. 
POINT VIII 
APPELLANTS ARE BARRED AND ESTOPPED FROM 
MAINTAINING ANY INTEREST ADVERSE TO THE 
INTERESTS OF PLAINTIFFS BY REASON OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. 
Appellants at all times in this action have been and 
are now estopped from claiming any interest in the property 
of the PROTHERO family, adverse to Plaintiff's interest by 
reason of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. If permitted 
to assert claims in derogation of Plaintiff's interest, a 
fraud will result. 
The silence of Defendant LEWIS PROTHERO at the time he 
determined he would purchase the property for his own benefit 
is a fraud. Had Plaintiff known of the tax delinquency, she 
would have been able to protect her interest. Relying, 
however, on the trust existing between the PROTHERO family 
members and based upon their express agreements and understand~ngs 
with respect to the property, and more particularly, to the 
effect that the person using the properties would pay the 
taxes, she did nothing. Such reliance, at least as asserted 
by Appellants, resulted in the loss of her property. 
Under these circumstances, the law bars and estopps 
Appellants from asserting claims which would result in 
stripping Plaintiff of her interest in the family properties. 
43 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
See 28 AM. JUR. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 26 - 117. 
CONCLUSION 
The surviving members of the PROTHERO family were 
tenants in common as to the family properties. The tenancy 
in common was not terminated by the sale of the properties 
to Iron County in January 1963 because of the failure to pay 
1962 taxes. In fact, part of the tenancy in common arose by 
the death intestate of BARTON PROTHERO in or about 1966. 
The tax sale in 1967 did not terminate the tenancy in connnon. 
The name of ALENE PROTHERO was placed on the tax deeds at 
the instruction of LEWIS PROTHERO. The money for the tax 
sale came from money earned only by LEWIS PROTHERO. ALENE 
PROTHERO did not contribute in any way. At the time of the 
sale, Appellants knew of the circumstances surrounding the 
parties. The family was a trusting family and Respondent 
stayed with Appellants for several years following the tax 
sale, when she visited the property in Iron County. Under 
the law, one tenant in connnon may not set up a purchase at 
tax sale in derogation of the title of his co-tenants. 
Further, tenants in cormnon stand in a fiduciary relationship 
with each other, especially where they are family members 
and are barred and estopped from asserting a claim which has 
its source in a breach of that relationship by the asserting 
p~rty. The statutes of limitations relied upon by Appellants 
do not apply to this situation. First, the tax deeds statute 
of limitations does not apply to disputes between those 
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entitled to the benefit of tax deed title. All the surviving 
PROTHERO heirs are entitled to the benefits of the tax deed, 
since it was purchased in trust by Appellants. Further, 
even if the statutes of limitations relied upon by Appellants 
were to apply, they did not run and expire prior to the 
filing of this action in August of 1977. Appellants' claims 
related to the tax deeds and adverse possession were not 
"brought home" to Plaintiff or anyone else until 1977. 
Defendants argue facts which are not supported by the record 
in an effort to take notice of Appellants' claims back 
beyond a time sufficient to apply the statutes of limitation. 
The trial court expressly found that even if the statutes of 
limitation were applicable, they did not run. In any event, 
the statutes did not run because Plaintiff was always in 
actual possession of the property in the normal use of it 
which would have been made by any non-resident owner. Further, 
Plaintiff was in legal possession as a tenant in common 
through the possession of LEWIS H. PROTHERO. 
Appellant ALENE PROTHERO obtained no interest by reason 
of the tax sale, greater than the undivided interest her 
husband otherwise enjoyed. In any event, she could not and 
did not obtain any interest at all, free of the claims of 
her husband's co-tenancy in common, being her brothers and 
sisters-in-law, since she full well knew of the circumstances. 
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, She did not pay any consideration for whatever interest she 
did obtain, and was not a bona fide purchaser. To permit 
the stripping of title from family members by other family 
members, under circumstances such as those in this case, is 
against public policy. 
Appellants are not entitled to the benefits of the laws 
relating to adverse possession. First, they have no valid 
color of title obtained in good faith. Second, they have 
not paid taxes for the required period of time. Prior to 
May of 1976, taxes were paid for the benefit of all the 
heirs. None of the improvements attributable to LEWIS H. 
PROTHERO were made pursuant to any claim of adverse possession. 
The improvements were not of major importance and did not 
cost much money. Further, they were totally consistent with 
the existence of a tenancy in common. ·The use made of the 
of a tenancy in cormnon. The use made of the properties by 
LEWIS H. PROTHERO was consistent with the existence of a 
tenancy in common. Appellant ALENE PROTHERO made no use of 
the properties. 
The trial court very properly imposed a trust upon 
appellants. This was and is necessary in order to prevent 
manifest injustice and the perpetration of a fraud by Appellants. 
Appellants are equitably barred and estopped from 
asserting any claims in derogation of Plaintiff's interest 
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in the PROTHERO family properties, since to bar them 
would be to permit Appellants to perpetrate a fraud, contrary 
to the manifest interest of justice in this action. 
The Decree of the trial court should be affirmed . 
.... , 
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